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Abstract 
 
 
By lexico-grammatically analysing a political interview in which a politician defends 
the government’s tough refugee policy, seven features of techno-bureaucratic 
discourse are identified. Within a ubiquitous semiotic of fear, political discourse can 
technologize inhumane practices so that it appears reasonable. Crucial to this process 
are the grammatical uses of the Hallidayan linguistic concepts of processes and 
nominals. The use and avoidance of certain processes as well as grammatical 
metaphor blunts agency and distances the speaker. Nominals provide the basis of a 
classificatory system that allows humans to be treated in certain ways according to 
bureaucratic processes. Finally, because democratic processes are represented as 
destabilizing these ‘objective’ techno-bureaucratic processes, it is implied that 
democracy should give way to orderly procedure.  
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Recent Australian political history shows that foreign aggression is still a winning 
political formula. Australia’s decision to join George Bush’s ‘Coalition of the 
Willing’ in the Second Iraq War followed on from a tough anti-refugee stance that it 
had taken for the past three years (Henderson, 2002; Kohler, 2003). While Australia’s 
willingness to join every war in which the USA has been involved since World War I 
is based largely on the perceived need of a powerful friend, its recent ‘get tough’ 
treatment of refugees (at odds with its enviable record accepting Vietnamese refugees 
in the 1970s and 1980s) needs another explanation. Australia’s foreign aggression is 
manifest in its Coalition of the Willing partnership, as well as its ‘get tough’ approach 
to refugees. While such aggression by a country that regards itself as relaxed and 
friendly can be attributed to the pervasive invasion myth, such a policy can also be 
politically dangerous. The purpose of this paper is to show how such a perverse 
political action as demonizing and incarcerating refugees is effectively articulated 
within a heteroglossic electorate. We argue that a two-part communication strategy is 
at work. Generally, the government creates a ubiquitous semiotic of fear built on 
ignorance and the demonizing of a recognizable ‘other’. The second part of the 
strategy is to technologize the inhumane at the quotidian level of interrogation by 
news and public affairs (or news analysis) programs. We are concerned primarily with 
the latter strategy; however, this analysis begins with a brief overview of the role of 
the ubiquitous semiotic. 
Ubiquitous Semiotic 
This concept draws on the concepts of orientalism provided by Said and of myths by 
Barthes. Given that this is not our central concern of this paper, the propositions are 
briefly stated.  
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Edward Said’s (1978) concept of orientalism explains how the West distinguishes 
itself from the East. Applied to the Australian context, orientalism would hold that the 
Middle East and South East Asia are historically situated as Australia’s other — its 
‘oriental’ (Said, 1978: 2-3). Australia’s notorious White Australia Policy, which 
remained in some form until the early-1970s since its inception in 1901, a response to 
an invasion of cheap Chinese and Pacific labour, was ‘racialist’ in that it feared an 
‘admixture of blood’ (Maddox, 2004: 67). This has produced the dilemma of 
Australia’s wishing for population growth while living in an Eastern location ‘at odds 
with its post-1788, colonizing heritage’ (Donnan, 1999). More recently orientalism 
has perpetuated the myth that Arabs need to be punished for the pain of September 11 
inflicted on the West. That many of the refugees were actually escaping the very 
tyranny against which George Bush and Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, 
went to war was never acknowledged by the Australian government. [The authors 
acknowledge that there were some asylum seekers who were not genuine refugees, 
based on first-hand accounts by reliable and humane government staffers]. 
  
In considering public, political postures and parlance, what matters to the electorate is 
the overall semiotic. Myths in the Barthesian sense are contingent discursive forms 
that perpetuate values and tokens of meanings (Barthes, 1973: 109-111). One of the 
most important enduring national myths has been Australia’s orientalist fear. In 
particular, it was the traditional privilege of being white and Anglo-Celtic (Curthoys 
& Johnson, 1998: 99), with its distrust of foreigners, that maintained the ideology of 
the White Australia Policy. Essentially this has manifested itself in a ‘yellow peril’ 
(fear of the Chinese, in particular) from Federation in 1901, a ‘red peril’ (fear of 
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Asian Communism) in the post-war era, and then a ‘brown peril’ (post-Communist 
distrust of Arabic and Middle-Eastern peoples). This contemporary materialization of 
the ‘brown peril’, presupposes a signifying consciousness through the older 
mythologies of invasion. That these fears never materialized (although Australia was 
bombed by the Japanese in World War 2), they remain mythological in that they are 
connected to usage rather than truth, thereby discounting the content (Barthes, 1973: 
110). Thus, given Australians’ ignorance of Middle-Eastern geopolitics, the 
government has been able to contribute to the overall semiotic of an incursion by 
Middle Eastern refugees as ‘orientals’ who not only have potential terrorist links, but 
act against the other mythological Australian characteristic of a ‘fair-go’ by ‘jumping 
the queue’.  
 
Technologizing the Inhumane 
While this general semiotic is at work, the government nevertheless has to deal with 
the scrutiny of the Australian media. In doing this, the Howard Government has to 
negotiate the discursively contested terrain. Apart from the liberal-left opposition, the 
Prime Minister (John Howard) faced opposition from a substantial number of 
conservative voters (normally pro-Howard) who were disturbed by populist politics 
and rough treatment of refugees; the small, but influential, Arabic and Muslim 
constituency; and possible international condemnation. Tactics that could be 
employed include grey rhetoric, strategic ambiguity, or tactical rhetoric. Gray rhetoric 
occurs when politicians engage in political utterances that simulate being adversarial, 
but which are disingenuous, perfunctory, and not necessarily persuasive (Waddell & 
McKenna, forthcoming), and merely contribute to what de Certeau (1985) labelled 
‘the jabberings of social life’. Strategic ambiguity refers to ‘those instances where 
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individuals use ambiguity purposefully to accomplish their goals’ (Eisenberg, 1984: 
230). Hamilton & Mineo (1998: 3) see it as forms of non-straightforward 
communication within politically charged discourses where equivocation, deliberate 
vagueness, and imprecise language are intentional. Speakers use intentionally 
ambiguous texts for addressing difficult issues because they ‘allow divergent 
interpretations to coexist and are more effective in allowing diverse groups to work 
together’ (Eisenberg & Whitten, 1987: 422). It is deliberately polysemous text. 
Tactical rhetoric includes those tactics such as repetition, bridging and distancing that 
seek to gain control during media interviews (Adkins, 1992; Thompson, 1998). 
 
However, while the ‘technologizing’ rhetoric that we propose incorporates tactical 
rhetoric, particularly bridging, its strategic purpose is to normalize the government’s 
tough refugee policy and then to technologize the issue. A fundamental element of 
this is to objectify the subjective: that is, to turn profound human issues into technical 
issues. This is consistent with Said’s (1978) claim that the imperial narrative 
corresponds to the more general subjective / objective (self / other) relationship 
evident particularly in Western literature. The following analysis, then, can be rightly 
labelled as critical discourse analysis in the sense defined by Wodak (2001: 2): 
‘analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’.  Of particular interest in 
this analysis is the way that ‘dominant structures stabilize conventions and naturalize 
them … [so that] the effects of power and ideology in the production of meaning are 
obscured and acquire stable and natural forms’ (Wodak, 2001: 3) 
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Methodology 
In saying that this analysis adopts a critical discourse analytic approach, it is 
acknowledged that this is an interdisciplinary ‘field of research’ (Chiapello & 
Fairclough, 2002; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 75; Meyer, 2001). This analysis 
will restrict itself to a sociolinguistic textual analysis to supplement the broader socio-
semiotic conception outlined above. In particular, we adopt partially Fairclough's 
(1995) approach to textual analysis. While Fairclough (1989: 31) acknowledges that 
‘discourse cannot be reduced to language’, discourses do ‘serve certain ends, namely 
to exercize power with all its effects. They do this because they are institutionalized 
and regulated, because they are linked to action’ (Jäger, 2001: 34). Fairclough 
analyses discourse through close textual analysis and then relates that to the social 
context in which the text is produced. The textual analysis uses Hallidayan systemic 
functional linguistics, which is particularly useful because it assumes that the 
language in texts encodes the ideational ‘into processes, events and actions, classes of 
objects, people and institutions, and the like’ organized into ‘logical relations’; as well 
as the interpersonal dimensions such as ‘speaking roles ... wishes, feelings, attitudes 
and judgements’ (Halliday, 1978: 21-22). By assuming that  language is a social 
semiotic, textual analysis yields for the analyst the sociocultural practices that it 
encodes both ideationally and intepersonally. That is, the ideational aspect is ‘the 
representation and signification of the world and experience’ (Fairclough, 1995: 133) 
which most accurately defines the discourse of a text, or its ‘way of signifying 
experience from a particular perspective’ (Fairclough, 1995: 135).  
The particular form of signification in this text is techno-bureaucratic discourse, and 
the perspective created maintains the myth of the invasive other for political ends. The 
term ‘techno-bureaucratic’ is used here to link the discursive features with those of 
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technocratic discourse (McKenna & Graham, 2000) and with those of bureaucratic 
discourse. The discourse under scrutiny is not technocratic because it does not apply 
to the texts produced by economic planners, strategic thinkers, scientific and social 
scientific experts, and the like. However, it shares with technocratic discourse some of 
the lexico-grammatical features, and its rhetorical purpose: namely, representing itself 
as ‘above the fray, as a supplier of neutral and objective “facts”’, while actually 
performing a hegemonic function (Lemke, 1995: 70). Instead of scientificity, 
however, techno-bureaucratic language employs legal discursive features. What they 
have in common are some of the lexico-grammatical features in technocratic 
discourse. One of the most important of these is the role of the nominal and nominal 
groups to taxonomize, to convert processes into static events through nominalization, 
and to define. Also of interest is the process (verb) use and human agency. 
 
Crucial to this analysis is how the lexis is related to the epistemic foundations 
(Foucault, 1972) of political belief. Because lexical words (nouns, main verbs, 
adverbs, and adjectives) encode content (Eggins, 1994: 101), the lexis provides the 
greatest denotative cue or trace of the (often unstated) episteme because it generates 
coherence in the sense that it ‘construes the social order without referring to the 
system it is construing’ (Halliday & Martin, 1993: 113). In other words, we invariably 
taxonomize and classify our universe as we choose the lexical items to make 
statements about it. This is consistent with the Foucaultian (1972: 48-49) 
understanding of ‘the intrication of a lexicon and an experience’ in which there 
emerges ‘a group of rules proper to a discursive practice’ which define ‘the ordering 
of objects’. The grammar is based on Halliday’s (1978; 1994) sociolinguistics. The 
lexico-grammatical devices will be explained as they are used in the findings.  
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Text Corpus 
The text selected for this analysis was an interview of former Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs Minister, Philip Ruddock conducted by Tony Jones on ABC’s Lateline and 
broadcast on 6 June 2002 (Jones, 2002). The lengthy interview (over 3000 words) 
questioned Philip Ruddock about a damning UN  report on Australia’s treatment of 
inmates of the immigration detention centres. Lateline is broadcast late at night and 
provides serious analysis of the day’s news. The portion of text spoken by Ruddock is 
2169 words. This text was analysed for a number of lexico-grammatical features. The 
findings are presented in two stages.  
Findings 
The Findings are divided into an analysis of the lexico-grammar of technologizing 
Processes, then of Nominals, before explaining the importance of discursive control 
when there is insincere compliance of techno-bureaucracy with democratic processes. 
 
Use of Processes 
Process is used in the Hallidayan sense to denote verb in Latinate grammar (Halliday, 
1994: ch. 5). Significantly, two features of bureaucratic discourse, passive voice and 
modality, are quite minimal in Ruddock’s interview. Only 24 (7.7%) of the processes 
are in passive voice, which would seem to negate the genre as bureaucratic text. 
Ruddock uses passive voice in three types of situations. It is used when he refers to 
unwanted advice and deductions, erasing the agent of that advice: for example,  
but no findings have been made to that; the sorts of deductions that have been 
made; advice I was given (twice); what's been said in the press conference.  
Ruddock also uses passive voice when he refers to people being detained so that the 
agent of detaining is not mentioned: e.g.,  
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people who are detained (twice); they are to be detained 
and when he refers to the government’s anti-refugee program or adaptations of it: e.g.,  
how those changes will be implemented;  an immigration program which is 
implemented; issues have to be addressed; steps that have to be dealt with. 
 
Modality, which “hedges” the probability or usuality of statements, is used by 
Ruddock relatively little, but in a significant way. Its limited use is inconsistent with a 
bureaucratic genre.  However, its relatively limited occurrence is significant in terms 
of what it does grammatically to the sentence. The usual modality devices of modal 
adjuncts (e.g., probably, possibly, perhaps: always, sometimes) and modal operators 
(e.g., might, must) are not used except in one instance:  
But it doesn't lead you to a conclusion that you release people because they 
might be suffering depression into the community. 
Despite considerable independent evidence, including that from the Immigration 
Detention Advisory Group [IDAG] that he appointed, Ruddock qualifies the 
possibility that detainees are actually suffering. Other modality devices, namely the 
four projections of I think and the tag, I believe, were used in the following instances: 
there have been, I think, seven deaths in detention 
and I think a number of them were from natural causes. 
I think two were from falls 
I think in terms of the number of incidents 
One was a Tongan, I believe 
Each of these refers to a death in custody. The presence of these hedges only when 
speaking of detainee deaths is important because it depreciates the gravity of these 
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events. Quite clearly, the Minister would have or should have known the exact 
number and type of deaths, given his obvious grasp of detail elsewhere. Thus it seems 
reasonable to infer that the minister intended to devalue the sadness and tragedy for 
political reasons.  
 
The Hallidayan understanding of the transitivity system is that it construes the world 
of experience into a manageable set of six process types (Halliday, 1994: 106). 
The text contained 
3 behavioural  processes: e.g., suffer depression 
79 material (action) processes, of which 
11 are concrete: e.g., simply abdicate, you release people, children 
should be separated 
68 are abstract: e.g., changes will be implemented, we maintain, we’ve 
been pursuing. 
65 verbal  processes: e.g., You’ve just argued, if you’re saying to me, I take 
advice 
54 existential processes: e.g., The fact is, It is, I’m not, That’s the point 
53 relational  processes: e.g., It is not possible, Woomera is inappropriate 
56 mental  processes: e.g., I think, I believe, I don’t know, we take the view 
The notable features of this basic analysis are the minute number of behavioural 
processes (< 1%), which represent physiological and psychological behaviour, and of 
concrete material (3.5%) processes, which represent physical activities of doing. This 
means that the text is bereft of physical and psychological behaviour expressed in 
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process form. Given that he is speaking of human trauma associated with placing 
probable refugees in detention and their acts of self-harm, one might reasonably infer 
that the Minister’s language is carefully chosen to avoid conveying sympathy or 
concern by him or the Government. Looked at more closely, of the three behavioural 
processes (i.e., outer manifestations of inner workings), two are about suffering, 
although one of those is modalized (might be suffering).  
 
Verbal processes are ‘symbolic relationships constructed in human consciousness and 
enacted in the form of language, like saying and meaning’ (Halliday, 1994: 107). The 
presence of a significant number of verbal processes (21%) points to the time-wasting 
and anaesthetizing process of outlining statements by various agents in the debate. 
Apart from the six imperatives (Look) which act as bridging devices “to terminate the 
relevance of further challenges” (Adkins, 1992: 43; Greatbatch, 1985), the verbal 
processes state that he heard, was advised or informed, [had] written, take[s] advice, 
put[s] the proposition. Because these are procedural, not substantive, they direct the 
answers away from the essence of the interviewer’s questions. In this exchange, 
Ruddock casts himself away from the agency of his action: 
TONY JONES:  In this case, aren't you the ultimate competent authority? 
PHILIP RUDDOCK: No, I'm not. I take advice in relation to these matters, and 
the advice comes from the relevant state authorities — the departments of family 
and community services around Australia. 
Instead of ‘listening’, a clear verbal process, Ruddock uses a grammatical metaphor 
(‘Take advice’), renders the potential action into a nominalization (‘advice’), and 
makes himself the receiver of the action (‘I take’), not the doer. In fact, he does take 
advice (or should), but, as the Immigration Minister, is the ultimate authority who 
usees that advice to effect his authority. Thus the grammatical construction sets out to 
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deceive. 
 
The grammatical metaphor limits the agency of the verb and blurs action. Martin 
(1992: 16) explains that the device produces a semantic content ‘requiring more than 
one level of interpretation’. Thus, when He departed because of bad conditions (the 
congruent structure) is rendered as Bad conditions led to his departure, two levels of 
interpretation are needed: the metaphor of leading (led) and the action itself 
(departure).  This grammatical action tends to construe experience as ‘things’ (nouns) 
rather than processes, and does not require conjunctive relationships using because, 
although etc. (Martin, 1992: 406-407). This text contains 18 grammatical metaphors. 
The most commonly occurring are those used when speaking of forming a view (4); 
judging and deciding (4); and stating a proposition (5). Thus when Ruddock speaks of 
forming a view it occurs as:  We take the view; came to the view; I've never taken that 
view; we took the view; views that only came from. When reporting on judgments and 
decisions, Ruddock speaks of taken the decision; conclusions they’ve come to; lead 
you to a conclusion; It doesn't come to that conclusion. When stating a proposition, 
Ruddock says: make the point (twice); point we made; point I made; the point I would 
make. The effect of these grammatical metaphors is to distance the speaker from the 
phenomenon in question. Thus, when using a grammatical metaphor to ‘take a view’, 
Ruddock in the following instance does not actually state that the UN investigative 
team were welcome to visit the Australian detention centre:  
Well, we took the view that if they [UN investigative team] wanted to 
come, we would give them an opportunity to look at the facilities and 
explain the operations to them. 
In this sentence, the reluctance to allow the UN team to investigate is made relatively 
opaque by using a grammatical metaphor as a projection leading, by way of a 
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qualifying clause (‘If …’), to the decision that the team would be allowed to visit. 
However, it is where this locution is used to deal with the phenomenon of refugee 
suffering that the opaqueness is more significant. Consider the following:  
PHILIP RUDDOCK: Well, I simply make the point that the issues in relation to 
behaviour in detention have to be addressed as issues requiring proper 
treatment and care for the people who are detained. But it doesn't lead you to a 
conclusion that you release people because they might be suffering depression 
into the community. It doesn't come to that conclusion. 
In this statement Ruddock uses a grammatical metaphor, make the point, to introduce 
his statement. This is a projection leading into a paratactic statement about dealing 
with refugee distress (in the form of suicide, self harm, and depression). This distress 
is renamed as ‘issues in relation to behaviour in detention’, a bureaucratic noun-
phrase devoid of the empathy implied in, say, ‘trauma victim’. This vague noun-
phrase becomes the subject of the passive verb ‘have to be addressed’, so that it is 
transformed into another noun-phrase ‘issues requiring proper treatment and care’. 
This re-named phenomenon then becomes the implied subject in the next sentence 
[‘it’]. This whole proposition (needing treatment and care) is not something that 
would ‘lead you’, Ruddock says, to setting them free. It is the proposition that 
wouldn’t lead you, not the actual suffering. Thus instead of saying The government 
does not believe that the fact that refugees are suffering is sufficient reason to set 
them free, Ruddock’s use of grammatical metaphors (make the point; doesn't lead you 
to a conclusion; doesn't come to that conclusion) and re-naming of suffering as 
‘issues’ effectively detaches him and the government from any causation. 
 
Agency is also blurred when potentially powerful processes (verbs) are nominalized 
and the verb function is taken by a verb-to-be acting as an existential process. 
Although, in one sense, statements such as There have been suicide attempts and 
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there have been seven deaths state that some fact exists. But, in another sense, it could 
be said that such a usage turns an action (suiciding and dying) into a nominal and in 
this way the unpleasant activity of people dying is de-activated. 
 
Role of Nominals 
As with technocratic discourse, nominals play an important role in techno-
burreaucratic discourse. Three such roles are identified. 
 
It is now evident that the minister can dull any acknowledgement of detainee 
suffering by nominalizing the action of suiciding (rendered as suicide attempts and the 
more ambiguous deaths). Self-mutilating is understood as an attempt to bring 
attention to themselves in the belief that it will help obtain a release. However, the 
nominal has other significant roles in techno-bureaucratic discourse. The nominal or 
nominal group1, provides a crucial element of the technocratizing process because, in 
science and technology, the foundation of all processes (actions, relations), is the 
classification of the object and its relation to other objects.  Ruddock’s justification 
presented below details the implied classification criteria for his calculative 
technology. From this classification system the appropriate logic for dealing with the 
people and things so classified is devised. The detainees are classified first as those 
who are without lawful authority. In fact, under international covenants to which 
Australia is a signatory, people claiming refugee status are not without lawful 
authority until such time as they are proved not to be refugees. Their ‘otherness’ is 
then asserted because they come from outside the borders, and so challenge the public 
interest, clearly implying that they not a part of that public. Later, in the interview, 
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Ruddock labels them as an arbitrary group in detention.  
PHILIP RUDDOCK: No, no, put it in context. If people turn up without lawful 
authority, they are to be detained. What other approach are you going to take 
other than to release people into the community and simply abdicate entirely the 
possibility of being able to manage and control your own borders and have an 
immigration program which is implemented in the public interest? 
Thus, nominals clearly provide the foundation for the Minister to act upon certain 
groups of people in certain ways according to their classification. 
 
Another, important techno-bureaucratic function of the nominal is to render 
unpleasant events and actions in bland terms. This is because it is important that 
potentially harmful or injurious outcomes are diminished. In the following extract, a 
refugee’s act of self-harm (mutilation, attempted suicide) becomes an incident report. 
That is, the human trauma becomes an act that is recorded (in a report) for acting 
upon within the bureaucratic guidelines of constraint:  
The number of incident reports, and they're not just involving Woomera, were 
something of the order of 230 over 90,000 detention days. 
Now objectified as incident reports, the Minister then assuages concern with 
‘objective’ data, presumably intended to show that the situation is not as grim as pro-
refugee advocates would have us believe. However, although the interviewer certainly 
could not have done the necessary calculations on the spot, the figures are, by any 
measure, alarming. Given that there were, on average, 350 inmates (using the 
minister’s own figures), then almost two-thirds of them, on average, were self-
harming or attempting suicide. 
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A third important role of the nominal group in the technologization process, 
dependent on the classification system detailed above is procedural language. For 
example, Ruddock states: 
Woomera is the only place where we've been able to institute an alternative 
detention model for women and children. 
In this way, the detention process is no longer denoted as a political issue because it 
has been normalized by the systems and processes that are set in place. The issue now 
is an organizational management one: models of control within an existing institution. 
In another part of the interview we learn that the private security company that 
services the centre has a very comprehensive code of behaviour outlined for the 
running of the detention centres. Bureaucratic processes are in place to ensure that 
contractors meet the conditions. It is important that uncertainty is reduced because this 
limits the capacity for completing the task.  
 
However, democratic processes clearly upset the orderliness of these bureaucratic 
processes: 
it is because people like the arbitrary group in detention and others expect that 
there will be an opportunity for decisions to be reviewed and like there to be 
systems of appeal that you have uncertainty in our system  
In other words, the democratic legal processes of review and appeal made available to 
the ‘arbitrary group in detention’ (now less even than putative refugees) upset the 
‘system’ by producing uncertainty. 
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Furthermore, given that there is a control process, the detainees have to behave: If 
they don’t, they become issues to be addressed. This is evident in Ruddock’s 
statement that:  
issues in relation to behaviour in detention have to be addressed as issues 
requiring proper treatment and care for the people who are detained. 
It is important to acknowledge that alternative discourses are available to the minister. 
For example, a medical discourse could be used. When traumatized refugees are held 
in remote detention centres (actually prisons) it is likely that they will display 
symptoms of psychological stress, even psychosis. However, even the relatively 
‘objective’ discourse of medicine could arouse sympathy for the refugees.  
 
The logic of action within the ‘system’, then, is clear. The refugee issue is not an issue 
of humanitarianism, but of managing and controlling your borders from those who 
fail to meet the defined category: 
the fact [is] we're a sovereign government that's entitled to take decisions in 
Australia's interests and for the protection of our community, and we do. 
Ruddock is implying that those who identify another duty, the duty of care to other 
citizens of the world, according to this form of calculative logic, do not respect the 
sovereignty of a nation protecting its community: in effect, they are traitorous. 
Clearly, refugees are not and will not be part of this community so defined. 
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Insincere Compliance of Techno-bureaucracy with Democratic Processes 
Because power in a democracy needs a mandate and a system of checks and balances, 
Minister Ruddock needs to maintain apparent compliance with this democratic 
procedure, even though the procedure is subverted. His insincere compliance is 
achieved in three ways, two of which involve the power of the minister to designate 
meaning. 
 
One way is to claim that the checking process has exceeded its mandate. Arbitrary 
ministerial power might be limited by an advisory group and by an external agency 
(the UN). However, there are clearly limits for his advisory group, an organizational 
mechanism ostensibly designed to make organizations more responsive. For Ruddock, 
this group clearly exceeded their role (their mandate, their remit) when they drew 
attention to the deeply disturbing features of the current system.  
And their mandate, their remit, is to look at whether or not the detention 
environment we have here is arbitrary. It is not arbitrary. 
Their role, to identify ‘whether the detention centre system we have here is arbitrary’ 
has already been determined by the minister. But, of course he can justifiably say that 
it is not arbitrary because there is a regime of classification and procedural action that 
is well documented. When the independent report delivers a negative judgement, then 
the report itself can be categorized as relatively less important because he has the 
authority to so define, or classify, it (apart from the techno-bureaucratic ploy of 
deferral). Of the damning report, Ruddock says: 
I think that the comments today were fairly superficial and certainly don't reflect 
a detailed consideration of all the issues. But when they do report 
comprehensively, I'll look at it to see whether there are improvements that can 
be suggested.    
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This response frames the report in such a way that it must, regardless of its findings, 
accommodate the system created by the minister. He will ‘look at it’, the report, in the 
dismissive manner one might reluctantly agree with one’s partner to ‘look at’ an 
unpromising clothing item with no intention of buying it. In agreeing that there might 
be ‘improvements’ in the next report, Ruddock clearly implies that the present 
structure will remain intact. 
  
The second way that Ruddock maintains insincere compliance is to determine those 
with/out the appropriate knowledge to speak and participate in the process. Again this 
is a techno-bureaucratic device designed to maintain power relationships. Consider 
this passage: 
I've heard their advice, and I've looked at the practical issues in relation to the 
way in which we should deal with Woomera. 
And I've made a decision about how those changes will be implemented. 
And I have written today in fact to IDAG, advising them that we treat the advice 
that they have given seriously and explaining to them the practical difficulties in 
implementing the advice they have given. 
Of lexico-grammatical interest here are the conjunctive clausal relationships and the 
adjectival use of the word practical. Conjunctions create ‘intersentence relationship’, 
or cohesion (Martin, 1992, p. 19). The conjunctive relationship is established through 
the coordinating conjunction, and. However, although grammatically the conjunction 
joins paratactic clauses, or equal clauses (thus creating a narrative), the semantic 
relationship is hypotactic. Crucial to this semantic relationship is the use of practical 
because this categorizes the bureaucratization of detention centre phenomena. More 
specifically, there are practical issues and practical difficulties. To take the first 
occurrence of and in the text above, Ruddock sets up an adversative relationship 
between their advice and practical issues. The second And ostensibly presents a 
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narrative (made a decision). But clearly the decision is anaphorically related to the 
categories in the prior sentence. Implicitly, the Minister is not going to be impractical 
(having looked at the practical issues), hence his decision is, by definition, practical. 
The third And is additive in the sense that it continues the narrative (wrote to IDAG), 
while the fourth and introduces the reasoning for his decision to reject their advice. 
The advice, we infer, has been rejected because it failed to fit the ‘practical’ category 
created in the first sentence. By technologizing inhumane practices as practical 
actions and processes, the system takes on a life of its own in no further need of 
ethical or humanitarian considerations. The minister agrees to make some changes, 
but not to fundamentally alter the logic of the system. 
 
The third way that Ruddock maintains insincere compliance with democratic 
procedure is to create apparent choice for the detainees. In response to the question: 
TONY JONES: Yes, but the question here and the question that is being focused 
on by your own independent advisory group, the questions being focused on by 
the UN, is what happens to people when they're in that detention environment 
and particularly children. They're saying they're exposed to a culture of 
endemic self-harm that is damaging for many people there, including the 
children. That is the argument coming from your own independent advisory 
group. 
Ruddock says (after an exchange) 
PHILIP RUDDOCK: … If the proposition is that children, for their own 
psychological and state of mind, should not be in detention, and the competent 
authorities form that view, they can be removed tomorrow.  
However, the techno-bureaucratic process sets up a definitional structure that makes 
such a choice for freedom virtually impossible for a caring parent. This is because the 
children cannot be accompanied by their parents in open society because their parents 
have to remain in detention. Thus a parent is faced with the treacherous choice: the 
child can be freed if the parent relinquishes them or they can remain together as a 
family in the prison. Thus the minister can confidently state that his advice is that  
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… when faced with the choice, and it is a choice, of in the community [sic] but 
without family or in detention with family, the decision has always been to date 
that they should remain in the latter situation.  
 
Technologizing Inhumanity 
Technologizing discourse has the strategic purpose of normalizing the government’s 
tough refugee policy and then to technologize the issue. Crucial to this outcome is 
objectifying the subjective by rendering people and human issues as technical issues. 
The technologizing discourse has a special strategic role in the government’s political 
campaign because it is set against the mythological background of the feared Other.  
 
However, the political expression of a politics of aggression feeding these myths 
cannot be overt. The problem for politicians is that they are discursively 
circumscribed in an age of ubiquitous news and public affairs and, hence, they cannot 
candidly demonstrate a politics of aggression under such scrutiny. In other words, 
they cannot actually say racist things or that “we want war”. The key to Bush and 
Australian Prime Minister Howard’s success in going to war was the repetition of a 
mantra, “Weapons of Mass Destruction” (WMDs), while creating the circumstances 
for the inevitability of war by moving soldiers into the Middle East, then claiming that 
‘we can’t bring them back now’. Thus, the process of justification alters temporally. 
The intended action begins as a May Be, as in ‘Australia may declare war on Saddam 
Hussein without United Nations approval’ (English & Farr, 2003). This becomes an 
Is: ‘Howard phones Camp David and says war is going well’ (Grubel, 2003). This 
becomes a Was, which leaders hope will be positive: ‘John Howard claimed 
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triumphant vindication for Australia’s participation in the Iraq war...declaring it had ... 
liberated an oppressed people’ (Barker, 2003). However, when outcomes are negative 
or ambiguous, governments have a way of disassociating from the past by projecting 
to the future. This is especially evident in the phrase ‘to move on’: ‘Australians had 
“moved on” ... no longer interested in ... Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction’ 
(Overington, 2003). 
 
While the government successfully used the mantras of illegal immigrants and queue 
jumpers, the overall discursive strategy is more complex. Effectively the refugee issue 
is no longer newsworthy, and opposition has dissipated. So the ‘was’ is largely 
irrelevant now as a political issue (whereas it is an enormous issue for George Bush 
trying to turn the Iraq quagmire into a Was). Despite the fact that the minister who 
recently replaced Ruddock announced that 90 percent (8260 of 9160 arrivals in the 
three years to July 2002; exact figures are hard to determine as several thousand boat 
people were deported or moved to various Pacific sites, such as Nauru) of the boat 
people had been classified as genuine refugees (Morris, 2003), there was no outcry at 
the government’s blatant dishonesty that greatly contributed to their 2001 electoral 
success. The role that Ruddock had to play while the issue was politically extant 
(during the ‘Is’ period) was to neutralize the inhumanity of the policy. He did this by 
using the technique of technologizing the inhumane. 
 
The essential elements of this discourse are derived from technocratic discourse. 
Technocratic discourse primarily establishes and maintains ‘a social élite, its claims of 
privilege and its access to power’ according to Lemke (1995: 61). It organizes the 
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universe in a particular way (Lemke, 1995: 76), thereby orienting the listener / reader 
/ viewer towards a particular way of seeing the world. As well, the discourse divests 
certain forms of social practices of their social, ethical, political, and moral values, 
thus presenting their discourses as objective, value-free truth (Saul, 1997: ch. 2). In 
this way, there is an ‘abridgement of meaning which has a political connotation’, but 
depoliticizes the discourse at the same time (Marcuse, 1968: 79).  
 
The discourse of techno-bureaucratic language with a rhetorical purpose of justifying 
inhumane practices is characterized by seven lexico-grammatical features, which are 
similar to technocratic language, but different.  
 
1. Modalize unpleasant outcomes so that they appear uncertain or unimportant. 
2. Limit the use of behavioral process words so that adverse physiological and 
psychological effects on or responses to victims’ plight is minimized. 
3. Respond to questions requiring a justification by providing a narrative 
account, preferably using anaesthetizing verbal processes used in identifying 
things that people say. 
4. Limit self-agency and blur action by using such devices as grammatical 
metaphors. 
5. Present actions not as processes (verbs) but as nominalizations or other 
nominal forms. 
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6. Create nominal taxonomies and hierarchies so that phenomena can be 
categorized in a way that those with power can manipulate and admit / turn 
away from consideration or relevance. 
7. Using these taxonomies, create a system of processes regulated by the 
person with the power to do so, not according to a set of principles (such as 
rights or democratic procedures). 
 
Calculative Technologies, Rhetoric, and Politics 
This paper uses an interdisciplinary Critical Discourse Analysis approach to consider 
political text from a semiotic, discursive, and lexico-grammatical perspective. From 
this, significant insights into current political communication techniques have been 
provided. These should be disturbing to those concerned to ensure bipartisan humane 
politics. Deliberative rhetoric, in the Aristotelian sense, is intended to lead to, or 
actively prevent, an action; in other words, it is concrete and purposeful (Remer, 
1999, pp. 41-42). It should motivate others to understand, support, or care for a 
philosophy, policy, cause, or notion that the locutor believes will improve the human 
condition (Aristotle, 1991). We argue that, in its place, an insidious form of political 
discourse is emerging, technologizing the inhumane. A defining characteristic of this 
form of discourse is ‘the apparent transformation of the subjective into the objective’ 
(Rose, 1992, p. 153). Underlying this is an ontological universe built upon the 
practices and claims by ‘experts of truth’ who determine ‘concepts of normality and 
pathology, danger and risk, social order and social control, and the judgements and 
devices which such concepts have inhabited.’ (Rose, 1999, p. 30). These discursive 
mechanisms present phenomena to us ‘as an intelligible field with specifiable limits 
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and particular characteristics’ (p. 33) that then naturalize certain activities, without 
ethical reference. 
If we wish to preserve democracy and to maintain humanitarian values, it is crucial 
then that we recognize and resist the technologies that logically, through systems of 
classification that exclude or include, present plausible policies that appear to protect 
us from the mythologies about the Other. 
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1 A nominal group is defined as a ‘noun phrase (a group of words where the main word is a 
noun)’ (Eggins, 1994, p. 44). 
